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Methods of Settling the Sino-Japanese 
Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands
SONG Yuxiang*
Abstract: In international law, procedural and substantial problems of interna-
tional dispute settlement are equally important. From a procedural perspective, use 
of force and peaceful means (including political means and legal means) are two 
basic methods of international dispute settlement. In the Sino-Japanese dispute 
over the Diaoyu Islands, since the use of force is strictly limited, peaceful means 
take center stage. For China, considering various aspects, political settlement 
is “relatively feasible but not desirable” while legal settlement is “relatively 
desirable but not feasible”. If the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is to be settled 
under the current situation, the result would probably be that China and Japan will 
segment the Islands. From the perspective of international law, this article intends 
to preliminarily explore the procedural problems of the Sino-Japanese dispute 
settlement over the Diaoyu Islands.  
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I. Introduction
From ancient times, at latest since the Ming Dynasty, the Diaoyu Islands have 
been discovered and preoccupied by Chinese ancestors. According to the view 
that “all the territory belongs to the Emperor” of Pax Sinica, the Diaoyu Islands 
are inherently Chinese territory. Due to various historic reasons, the Islands were 
unjustly occupied by Japan. Japan obtained occupation of the Diaoyu Islands after 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki and occupied the Islands until now, which causes serious 
territorial disputes with China. This aggression hurts the feelings of the Chinese 
people, who are closely intertwined with political, economic, and national defense
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factors. For this reason it has become one of the most complicated and difficult 
territorial disputes in the world.
From an international law perspective, the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands 
dispute touches upon substantial and procedural problems. With regard to 
sovereignty of the Islands, both China and Japan, including authorities and scholars, 
stick to their own argument, making an utmost effort to prove that sovereignty 
of the Islands belongs to its own country. Japan tends to make a demonstration 
based on international law while China relies on historic rights by textual research 
of historical facts and evidence. However, there have been few scholars who 
performed research on how this dispute can be settled and its feasibility. For dispute 
settlement, proper method or procedure is as important as reasonable arguments – 
reasonable arguments are not always feasible.
In consequence, this article focuses neither on historic research of the dispute 
nor on the substantial problems in international law of the problem, but on 
discussing settlement methods of the dispute and their feasibility, i.e. procedure 
problems. Towards this goal, the author has made an in-depth comparison of 
different dispute settlement mechanisms, including use of force and peaceful means 
represented by diplomatic method and legal method, with special consideration 
given to China Taiwan’s involvement, and has explored the best and feasible 
method for China to adopt.
With respect to research methods applied, this article makes use of 
comparative research method and correlation method. The former finds its 
expression in comparison among various methods of international dispute 
settlement and the pursuit of relatively desirable and feasible methods for China; 
the latter is embodied in the comprehensive consideration of the Sino-Japanese 
Diaoyu Islands dispute and the dispute of the continental shelf in the East China 
Sea. The conclusion of the present article leads towards a “paradox” for China 
that is determined by the overall situation of Sino-Japanese political and economic 
relations, which concerns not only the Diaoyu Islands dispute itself – an isolated 
research method would probably lead to a “utopian” conclusion.
II. Comparative Research on Settlement Methods for the
      Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
A. Use of Force
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Traditionally, international dispute settlement methods can be classified as use 
of force and peaceful means. “Traditional international law recognizes war is the 
instrument to implement State policies and is a legal means of settling international 
disputes. ‘Jus ad bellum’ is a legal right of sovereign States.”1 Such right is 
inherent and self-evident, just like basic human rights in human rights law which 
define human beings. Hugo Grotius, the father of modern international law, values 
natural law and argues that “so far from any thing in the principles of nature being 
repugnant to war, every part of them indeed rather favours it”, “for the preservation 
of our lives and persons, which is the end of war, and the possession or acquirement 
of things necessary and useful to life is most suitable to those principles of nature”.2
However, after World War I, and especially after World War II, jus ad bellum 
was gradually subject to limitation and finally prohibited. The 1928 Pact of Paris3 
was first to limit the jus ad bellum of States.4 The Covenant of the League of 
Nations further imposed restrictions.5 The current regulation on the use of force is 
provided by the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2 of the Charter explicitly 
states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations”, and “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered”. This has prohibited both jus ad bellum and the use of force in any 
other manner, except under two conditions: self-defence and actions taken or 
1       Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, p. 236. (in Chinese)
2       Hugo Grotius, translated to English by Campbell, translated to Chinese by He Qinhua et al., 
The Rights of War and Peace, Shanghai: Shanghai People Press, 2005, p. 50. (in Chinese)
3      The full name is General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, or the Kellogg–Briand Pact.
4       Article 1 of the Pact of Paris stipulates that: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare 
in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution 
of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another.” Article 2 stipulates that: “The High Contracting Parties agree 
that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever 
origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific 
means.”
5     Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulates that: “in no case to resort 
to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the 
report by the Council.”
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authorized by the Security Council.6
Recent international law has put strict limitations on the use of force by States 
and China is no exception in its disputes. Resorting to use of force to settle the 
Diaoyu dispute would have to meet these two exceptional conditions provided by 
the Charter of the United Nations. It is unlikely that the Security Council would 
authorize China to use force or directly take actions against Japan and thus whether 
or not China is entitled to use of force depends on whether the condition of “self-
defence” is met in the Diaoyu Islands dispute.
The present author believes that China still enjoys the inherent right of self-
defence for the Diaoyu Islands. Considering the exercise of the right to self-
defence, the International Court of Justice has pointed out in the judgment of 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States) case that, “whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on 
observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures 
taken in self-defence”.7 The criteria of “necessity” and “proportionality” are two 
indispensable conditions for the exercise of self-defence. The former means self-
defence can only be exercised when the State is under “an armed attack”, which is 
a precondition for invoking the right of self-defence; the latter is a principle that 
should be complied with in the process of defensive attack. It requires that the right 
of self-defence exercised in response to the armed attack should be proportionate 
to damages suffered and is aimed at returning to the status quo that existed prior to 
the attack. Since the 1970s, when Japan began to exercise its military control over 
the Diaoyu Islands and the surrounding sea area, it drove away or even shelled 
fishermen from China Taiwan and the civil Diaoyu Islands defending activists, 
resulting in injuries and deaths.8 Such military control and blockade is obviously 
6     Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates: “Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Article 42 stipulates: 
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations.”
7     Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, pp. 124~125. (in 
Chinese)
8      Records of the Diaoyu Islands Preservation Movement over the Years, at http://www.
diaoyuislands.org/fwl/1.html, 22 May 2006. (in Chinese)
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a form of armed attack. Although promptness is an important content of necessity, 
Japanese military control and blockade of the islands are continuous, meaning that 
China has always been under an armed attack. As stated by Hans Kelsen, “as long 
as the status of the territory is that of belligerent occupation, and that means as long 
as there is a state of war between the occupied State and the occupying State.”9 
Since the state of war continues, exercise of self-defence is unobjectionable. 
Therefore, if the state of armed attack continues, under the situation that other 
measures cannot solve the Diaoyu Islands dispute, self-defence is not contrary to 
the requirement of promptness, i.e. necessary. Professor Wang Tieya has stated 
in commenting the Gulf War, “the occupation of all Kuwait territory by Iraq in 
1990 constitutes a continuing armed attack, making the exercise of the right of 
self-defence legalized”.10 Such a “continuing armed attack” is exactly the same as 
Japanese military control and blockade over the Diaoyu Islands and China certainly 
has the right to self-defence.
Even if Japan has occupied the Diaoyu Islands illegally, its scholars advocate 
the use of force to settle the dispute. They strongly argue that the Diaoyu Islands 
fall into the scope of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States and Japan, hoping to protect its actual control over the Diaoyu 
Islands through force with the help of America. It even threatens the U.S. with war 
to contain the opposing views of the latter: “for the behavior of yelling conflicts 
in theories while remaining calm and changing attitudes randomly, we cannot 
help but think of the inconsistent behavior of President Wilson in the Versailles 
Peaceful Conference, which has caused mistrust of Japanese on the United States 
and will further lead to the war against the United States”.11 This type of straight 
forward behavior of advocating war has exposed Japan’s attitude of not obeying 
international law, which serves as a foil to the importance for China of exercising 
the right to self-defence.
9     Hans Kelsen, translated by Wang Tieya, Principles of International Law, Beijing: Huaxia 
Publishing House, p. 243. (in Chinese)
10     Hans Kelsen, translated by Wang Tieya, Principles of International Law, Beijing: Huaxia 
Publishing House, p. 125. Emphasis added by the original author. (in Chinese)
11     Katsunori Nakamura, The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United 
States and Japan and the Senkaku Islands, in Cheng Chia-Jui ed., Legal Status of the Diaoyu 
Islands, Taipei: Law School of Soochow University, 1997, p. 79. “The behavior” refers to 
the fact that the United States remained neutral on the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands dispute 
and excluded the Islands from the application scope of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between the United States and Japan.
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B. Peaceful Means
1. Political Means
Peaceful settlement of international disputes refers to settlements by means 
other than the use of force, i.e. settling international disputes through political 
means (diplomatic means) or legal means.12 Political means, sometimes also 
referred to as diplomatic means, is the method of settling international disputes 
between the two interested parties through peaceful means other than legal method. 
It can involve a third party besides the two parties concerned, and generally 
includes: negotiation, consultation, investigation, mediation, intervention and 
reconciliation.13 Whatever the name or the form it carries, its essence is that the 
disputing parties enjoy dominant status for dispute settlement and the binding 
force of the final result completely depends on the consent of the disputing parties; 
even if a third party is involved, its decision is of no binding force on the disputing 
parties, unless consent from the parties is given.
In choosing peaceful means of international dispute settlement, “States 
tend to believe in and be accustomed to the diplomatic methods and the wisdom 
of negotiations outside a court”.14 This is especially true with powerful States. 
Different from the ultimate purpose of judicature which is to pursue fairness, 
diplomatic method is based on power. Powerful States often do not need to 
resort to judicial process. They can obtain more national interest by settling 
disputes through diplomatic efforts based on power rather than through judicial 
processes. Consequently, powerful States are inclined to settle disputes through 
political means and explicitly reject international arbitration or judicature and 
limit or refuse intervention of a third party. As a matter of fact, legal method is 
the dispute settlement method which less powerful States prefer; to some extent, 
legal method is of assistance to less powerful States. “Under the condition that 
national power is not sufficient to contend against powerful States, resorting to 
international organizations and international judicial mechanisms is an opportunity 
for less powerful States to realize their own interest demand and find international 
12     Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, p. 569. (in Chinese)
13     Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, p. 569. (in Chinese)
14    Su Xiaohong, Why Powerful States Dislike International Judicature, Law Science, No. 11, 
2003. (in Chinese)
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justice”. 15 Both China and Japan are States with significant and equivalent national 
power. Since powerful States are confident in solving disputes through diplomatic 
negotiations, they are obviously in favor of the diplomatic method.
However, the result of any diplomatic settlement, especially when it is based 
on negotiation between States of equivalent national power, is always a give-
and-take compromise and neither a complete win nor a complete loss. This is 
because under the condition that neither party can suppress the other party with its 
power, a complete loss is not acceptable for disputing parties. If a compromise of 
interest is not reached, it means negotiations have failed. Consequently, settling 
the Diaoyu Islands dispute through diplomatic means would probably result in the 
segmentation of the Islands between China and Japan. If China or Japan obtains the 
full sovereignty of the Islands they would at the same time pay compensation of 
interest in other aspects to the other party.
As for the result of segmenting the Diaoyu Islands by negotiation, although 
there still leaves much to be desired for both China and Japan, the result is 
grudgingly acceptable compared to a complete loss.
2. Legal Means – International Arbitration and 
International Judicial Settlement
Legal means of international dispute settlement mainly refers to settlements 
through arbitration and judicial judgment,16 namely legal means mainly includes 
arbitration and judicature. Its fundamental character is that the consent of the 
disputing States is required prior to arbitration or judicature. Once consent is given, 
the dominant power of settling the dispute is controlled by a third party, and its 
adjudication or judgment has legally binding force on the disputing parties even 
without the consent of them.
Compared to the diplomatic method, settlement by legal method is based 
on legal rules, including substantial rules and procedural rules, rather than 
power or negotiation skills. It is usually relatively fair to disputing parties and 
the result is relatively fair. In addition, international courts and arbitral tribunals 
have comprehensive experience in dealing with cases of territorial disputes and 
15    Su Xiaohong, Why Powerful States Dislike International Judicature, Law Science, No. 11, 
2003. (in Chinese)
16     Traditional international law has divided methods of international dispute settlement into 
two categories: compulsory and non-compulsory. Non-compulsory ones are further classi-
fied as political ones and legal ones, the latter including arbitration and judicature. See 
Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, p. 453. (in Chinese)
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delimitation of continental shelves. Their judgment or adjudication is comparatively 
convincing and generally will be executed effectively. Furthermore, legal decisions 
are usually definite, final and permanent. The dispute will be completely solved and 
once it is solved, there would be no controversy in the future. From the perspective 
of the overall situation of Sino-Japanese relations, solving the Diaoyu Islands 
disputes in a final and permanent way by submitting it to an international arbitration 
or judicature benefits the reduction of frictions and conflicts and helps the  positive 
development of relations between the two States.
Despite all of the above, adoption of legal means is not realistic or feasible 
because of the particular circumstances of the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands 
dispute. Under the situation of “international anarchy”, both the adoption of 
arbitration and judicature require the consent of the disputing States. Without 
the States’ consent, even the International Court of Justice cannot exercise its 
jurisdiction. According to Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, there are three categories of jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice: (1) any cases submitted by the disputing States which are not limited to 
those of legal nature, i.e. voluntary jurisdiction; (2) matters or disputes specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions 
in force, i.e. conventional jurisdiction; (3) all legal disputes declared by States in 
advance over which they recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice as compulsory ipso facto, i.e. optional compulsory jurisdiction.17 However, 
the author believes it is hardly possible for both China and Japan to give consent 
to submit the disputes to arbitration or judicature for various reasons, mainly 
including:
a. Common Reasons for China and Japan
The special character of the Diaoyu Islands dispute is its close link to politics. 
In fact, it is political matters rather than legal matters that make the dispute difficult 
to solve.
In modern history, China’s territorial borders were affected by Japanese 
aggression, and therefore any territorial disputes are increasingly sensitive. China 
17    Wang Tieya ed., International Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 1995, p. 590 (in Chinese).
Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: (1) The jurisdiction 
of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 
(2) The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize 
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes.
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perceives Japan’s territorial claim over the Diaoyu Islands as the resurgence of 
the Japanese militarism that harmed China in the past. This is deeply engraved 
in Chinese peoples’ minds. A scholar has expressly pointed out that national 
feelings of the Islands is an issue for relevant parties, especially for Chinese people 
(including Mainland and Taiwan) who directly suffered from this aggression in 
modern history.18 Japan also regards China’s territorial claim as the resurgence of 
its nationalism and is sometimes afraid of China’s revenge for its own aggression. 
In consequence, both parties have been vigilant about territorial problems.
More sensitively, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is closely related to the 
continental shelf delimitation in the East China See and directly determines the 
ownership of oil and gas resources in the area. The continental shelf surrounding 
the Diaoyu Islands has abundant oil and gas resources.19 The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) conducted a geophysical 
investigation in the East China Sea area with a United States investigating ship 
during 12 October 1968 and 29 November of the same year. The report was 
published in May the next year and concluded that the continental shelf between 
China Taiwan and Japan is probably one of the most abundant deep-sea oil fields in 
the world. The continental shelf of the Taiwan Strait Basin which is approximately 
200 thousand kilometers, contains abundant oil resources that at least match those 
in the Persian Gulf. The most conservative estimation would be of 80 billion 
barrels.20 The Diaoyu Islands are located exactly at the edge of the basin that is rich 
in oil and gas. With the establishment of the legal system regarding continental 
shelf in the law of the sea after World War II, the importance of the Diaoyu Islands 
in delimiting continental shelf in East China Sea began to emerge. The sovereignty 
of the Islands directly involves the ownership of oil and gas resources in the East 
China Sea. The significance of these oil and gas resources is self-evident for Japan, 
18    Phil Deans, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The Unwanted Controversy, at http://www.
kent.ac.uk/politics/research/kentpapers/deans.html, 20 March 2006. 
19     Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Part I), in Cheng Chia-Jui ed., Legal 
Status of the Diaoyu Islands, Taipei: Law School of Soochow University, 1997, p. 228. See 
also Wu Tianying, A Textual Research on the Ownership of the Diaoyu Islands before the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Also a Queryto Professor Okuhara Toshio and Others, 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, pp. 7~8. (in Chinese)
20     Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Part I), in Cheng Chia-Jui ed., Legal 
Status of the Diaoyu Islands, Taipei: Law School of Soochow University, 1997, p. 228. See 
also Wu Tianying, A Textual Research on the Ownership of the Diaoyu Islands before the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Also a Queryto Professor Okuhara Toshio and Others, 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, pp. 7~8. (in Chinese)
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a State with limited territory and even more limited resources; for China, with the 
rapid development of its national economy, the demand for oil and gas resources 
grows with each year. Since becoming a net importer of oil products in 1993 and a 
net importer of crude oil in 1996,21 China has imported 120 million tons of crude 
oil in 2004. In 2010, the demand for oil in China would reach 350~380 million 
tons and the degree of dependence on import would be as high as 51.4%~52.6%,22 
which will create a great shortage of oil and gas resources. For these reasons, 
having ownership of the Diaoyu area resources can directly influence both China 
and Japan’s future economic development. However, due to its fundamental 
importance, this issue traverses into the political realm. 
Traditionally, disputes involving fundamental political and economic interests 
of a State, for instance, dispute of honor, are “non-justiciable disputes”. As claimed 
by a scholar, “[a]ccording to a widespread opinion, existing international law is not 
applicable to all possible disputes between States, since there are disputes which, 
by their very nature, cannot be settled by the decision of an international tribunal 
applying existing international law to the dispute. Such disputes, frequently 
excluded in treaties of arbitration from the jurisdiction of international tribunals 
established by these treaties, are disputes which affect vital interests, or the 
independence, or the honor of a party to the dispute.”23 The Sino-Japanese Diaoyu 
Islands dispute is highly non-justiciable due to national feelings, political and 
economic factors. Moreover, “sovereignty disputes of offshore islands in modern 
Northeast Asia are not likely to be solved by judicature or intervention of a third 
party,”24 China and Japan are of no exception.
As far as the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands dispute is concerned, applying a 
legal method would always result in either a complete win or a complete loss. If 
submitting to international arbitration or judicature, China or Japan, whichever 
wins the case, will obtain full sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Namely, either 
21     Xuan Xiaowei, Solving the Difficulties of Importing Oil for China, at http://www.china.org.
cn/chinese/OP-c/727528.htm, 23 April 2006.(in Chinese)
22     National Development and Reform Commission, The Degree of Dependence on Imported 
Oil Will Exceed 50% in 2010, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-02/16/
content_2583742.htm, 23 April 2006. (in Chinese)
23    Hans Kelsen, translated by Wang Tieya, Principles of International Law, Beijing: Huaxia 
Publishing House, p. 318. (in Chinese)
24     Choon Ho Park, Some Negative Factors in Solving Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia, 
in Cheng Chia-Jui ed., Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands, Taipei: Law School of Soochow 
University, 1997, p. 74. 
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China or Japan will possess the Islands as a whole and segmentation will not take 
place. This is because evidences of China and Japan all support the result of a 
complete win or a complete loss: if Chinese evidence is effective and admitted by 
the court or arbitral tribunal, the Diaoyu Islands will be considered terra nullius 
before 14 January 1895 and sovereignty of all the Islands will be obtained by 
China; in contrary, if Chinese evidence is declared invalid by the court or arbitral 
tribunal and Japan’s evidence is effective, the Diaoyu Islands before that date had 
already been obtained by Japan through its preoccupation and they were not terra 
nullius any more, then Japan will acquire all of the Islands. However, a complete 
loss is unacceptable for both China and Japan. It will be a political disaster for the 
authorities in power. Therefore, both parties would be more cautious in submitting 
the dispute to judicature or arbitration and in fact, both parties have explicitly 
refused to solve the dispute by arbitration or judicature: Japan issued a press release 
on 19 July 1996, in which it stated that the Japanese government does not believe 
there is any reason for resorting to a regional court to solve the dispute, since there 
is no territorial dispute at all as a matter of fact. China also warned the United 
States not to intervene in the current dispute in October 1996. The spokesman of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China once expressed: “the dispute involves China 
and Japan, a third party is not allowed to intervene”.25
b. Respective Reasons for China and Japan
(a) Japan’s Particular Reasons for Refusing Judicature or Arbitration
Japan is currently exercising control over the Diaoyu Islands and occupies a 
better position in the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands dispute. In international law, 
the act of “de facto control” results in certain legal effect. To some extent, facts 
generate rights and “control is half of the law”.26 Japan intends to consolidate 
the established fact of its “de facto control” with the lapse of time, and offset 
the illegitimacy of its aggression by exercising long-time “de facto control”. It 
is definitely not in favor of submitting to judicature or arbitration. Furthermore, 
Japan even refuses to solve the Diaoyu Islands dispute in any other manner, 
since it believes that there is no dispute at all with regard to sovereignty over the 
25     Jr. William Schachte, My View on Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute, in Taiwan Law Society 
(TLS) and Taiwan Institute of International Law (TIIL) eds., The Seminar on International 
Law of the Diaoyu Islands: Records of Discussion and Essays, 1997, p. 62. (in Chinese)
26    Choon Ho Park, Some Negative Factors in Solving Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia, 
in Cheng Chia-Jui ed., Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands, Taipei: Law School of Soochow 
University, 1997, p. 73.
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Diaoyu Islands and claims its “legitimate” sovereignty groundlessly by taking the 
advantage of being in control of the Islands.
(b) China’s Particular Reasons for Refusing Judicature or Arbitration
In solving the Diaoyu Islands dispute, China’s refusal to submit to judicature 
or arbitration is based on its historic experiences, differences between Chinese and 
western culture and the current situation of separate governance of China Mainland 
and China Taiwan.
Firstly, modern international law has caused immense harm to China, leaving 
permanent historic scars. Since being forced into the modern international law 
system in the middle of the 19th century, international law has almost never 
sought justice for China; on the contrary, it helped western powers invade China. 
The customary legal system exercised by China over thousands of years is Pax 
Sinica, which has been implemented effectively and successfully. Since the Opium 
War in 1840, the invasion of western powers gradually ruined this customary 
order and thoughts of modern international law were introduced. However, after 
the collapse of Pax Sinica, “it was not substituted by the modern international 
order based on sovereign States system, but the order of unequal treaties. It is the 
unequal treaties, rather than rules and principles of international law, that have 
been applied in China’s foreign relations.”27 Western powers declined to apply 
modern international law order to China, but applied one of its basic principles – 
“pacta sunt servanda” to China, in order to force it to observe the unequal treaties, 
which resulted in serious violations of Chinese sovereignty in politics, economy, 
national defence, culture and other various fields. This caused significant losses of 
territory in northeast, northwest and southwest areas of China. After World War I, 
China attended the Paris Peace Conference as a victorious State and invoked the 
famous principle of “fundamental change of circumstances” to recover Shandong 
and abolish unequal treaties, but it only faced resistance from the United Kingdom, 
France, the United States and other powerful States. The Conference finally refused 
China’s legitimate request to abolish unequal treaties and transferred Germany’s 
rights in Shandong, China to Japan.
Secondly, China has its own cultural tradition that is different from western 
cultures. Such cultural traditions have a unique mode of thinking and expression 
of language, namely it adopts image thinking and substantial logic, rather than the 
27    Wang Tieya, Introduction of International Law, Beijing: Peking University Press, 1998, p. 
391.
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rigorous formal logic that is present in western culture. “The dividing line of legal 
culture in China and western States has generated different manifestations and 
characteristics in value idea, political organizations, power operations, political 
logical thinking and other fields... The international rule of law which is centered 
on international judicature, originates from a western cultural background and its 
basic principles and operation methods are full of western characteristics, which are 
incompatible with Chinese local cultural tradition and intrinsic thinking method.”28
Such mode of thinking and expression of language leads to a situation where 
western scholars cannot fully and reasonably understand China’s real intentions 
of the evidence it provides for its claims. Ancient Chinese evidence regarding the 
Diaoyu Islands which is definite and sufficient then will become uncertain and even 
distorted. The work report written by the officer sent to the Ryukyu Islands in the 
Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty concerning “Heigou” or “Jiao” as the territorial 
boundary between China and foreign States, except for the intentional distortion by 
some hired Japanese scholars, could only be interpreted as the boundary between 
terra nullius and foreign territory by modern international law that originated from 
western cultural tradition.29
28     Su Xiaohong, An Analysis of Difficulties and Measures for China to Engage in International 
Judicial Proceedings, Journal of East China Normal University ( Philosophy and Social 
Sciences), No. 3, 2004. (in Chinese)
29   Kangxi 23th year in Qing Dynasty (1683), The Record of the Mission to the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, the work report by Wang Ji, the officer sent to the Ryukyu Islands stated: “(24th 
day) passed Pengjia Hill during the period from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and passed the Diaoyu 
Islands during the period from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. ... Saw the hill on the 25th day, first 
Huangwei, then Chi Yu, shortly reached Chi Yu and no longer saw Huangwei Yu. Passed the 
Jiao (or Gou) at dusk... What does the Jiao mean? Answer: Boundary between China and 
foreign land. How to determine the boundary? Answer: Guess. However, the slope is right 
there and the guess is not ungrounded.” The work report of Zhang Xueli had similar records 
in Kangxi 2nd year in Qing Dynasty (1663). However, for the statements, Japanese hired 
scholars, for instance Okuhara Toshio, interpreted the above content as: “since the work 
report was written by Chinese, if Chi Yu were Chinese territory with Kumejima Island as 
the boundary, everyone would undoubtedly record this, for example, Chi Yu is the boundary 
hill of China and the Ryukyu Islands. However, the logic of Mr. Yang (referring to Yang 
Chongkui, a Taiwanese scholar) ignored that before determining whether the island belongs 
to China or the Ryukyu Islands, there may be a situation where the island belongs to neither 
China nor the Ryukyu Islands. That’s where the problem lies.” Quoted from Wu Tianying, A 
Textual Research on the Ownership of the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895: Also a Queryto Professor Okuhara Toshio and Others, Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 1994, p. 52 (in Chinese). He means that measuring Chinese traditional 
customary order in ancient times by modern international law, if Chinese government did 
not label Chiwei Yu as “Chinese Chi Yu”, the Island becomes res nullius in international 
law. However, according to the territory view of “all the territory belongs to the Emperor”, 
there is no res nullius as such in Pax Sinica.
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The historic harm modern international law has inflicted upon China and 
the differences of Chinese and western cultural tradition resulted in a lack of 
Chinese trust in modern international law. An example is the withdrawal by the 
government of the People’s Republic of China in 1972 of the declaration made 
by the government of the Republic of China in 1946 on accepting compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Western international law scholars 
had an explicit statement on this problem: “Among the political factors which 
affect the effectiveness especially of the ICJ, the most prominent ones are doubts 
concerning the impartiality of the bench, fears connected with the lack of clarity of 
international law and finally a growing tendency to demonstrate overt disregard for 
the pronouncements of the Court... Judges from the Third World represent a cultural 
background which tends to favor a drastic change in the substance of traditional 
rules to bring them into line with present-day needs of less-developed countries. 
Therefore, countries which uphold the more legalistic approach feel hesitant about 
bringing a dispute before the Court…”30 Until now, China has never submitted 
any Sino-foreign political or territorial disputes to judicature or arbitration. Such a 
trust crisis seriously hinders China from submitting the Diaoyu Islands dispute to 
judicature or arbitration.
Lastly, the current situation of separate governance of China Mainland and 
China Taiwan determines that the Diaoyu Islands dispute will not be likely to be 
submitted to arbitration or judicature. 
For historic reasons, the situation is that two separate administration across the 
strait have been formed: one in China Mainland and the other in China Taiwan. The 
China Taiwan area enjoys a de facto high degree of self-autonomy. A legitimate 
national government – the government of the People’s Republic of China exists 
in China Mainland, which is also recognized by most States in the world. The 
situation of separate governance causes severe internal friction of power on the 
Chinese side in solving the Diaoyu Islands dispute.
For China Taiwan, avoiding China Mainland and unilaterally resorting to 
arbitration or judicature with Japan may result in a legal recognition of China 
Taiwan’s “independent” status. This is possible, since, through either international 
arbitration or judicature, the parties involved in a territorial dispute must be 
30    Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ed., translated by 
Chen Zhizhong and Li Feinan, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Guangzhou: Sun 
Yat-Sen University Press, 1998, pp. 110~111. (in Chinese)
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States or similar entities. Such entities that are entitled to initiate litigations in the 
International Court of Justice are limited to “States”.31 Arbitration also provides 
high-level legal support for the “independence” of China Taiwan. In consequence, 
if China Taiwan unilaterally decides to solve the dispute with Japan by arbitration 
or judicature, it will certainly move towards “independence”.32In such a case it 
would definitely face strong opposition from China Mainland. Furthermore, if 
Japan cannot solve this dispute through consultations with China Mainland, and if 
China Taiwan follows the above mentioned course of action, it means that Japan 
will probably intervene in China’s internal affairs and efforts towards unification. If 
China Mainland cannot secure its interests in other disputes, Japan is likely to use 
China Taiwan’s desire for “independence” to coerce China Mainland and further 
suppress China in its international relations and strategy. China Mainland will 
definitely not acquire sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands at the price of China 
Taiwan’s independence, not to mention that it is still uncertain if China will acquire 
sovereignty over the Islands by legal means.
For China Mainland, it is the only legitimate government that is recognized 
by Japan. Therefore, if cases were submitted for arbitration or judicature, only 
the China Mainland and Japanese governments would be able to engage in 
such a process. If China Taiwan wants to participate in arbitration or judicature 
proceedings, it can only participate as the Chinese side, namely they together 
constitute one party of the dispute. Any other manner that treats China Taiwan as 
an independent party or an intervening third party will not be accepted. However, 
if treating the government of China Mainland and Taiwan authorities together 
as one entity, it will not be accepted by China Taiwan since, to some extent, it 
signifies its consent for Chinese unification. But China Taiwan currently has no 
strong intention to unify with China Mainland. Yet, if the course of action excludes 
China Taiwan, it will aggravate the already tense relations between China Mainland 
31     Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates: “The Court shall 
be open to the States parties to the present Statute”. 
32     In the Conference of International Law Regulating the Diaoyu Islands, Yilan, Taiwan, 1997 
held by Taiwan Law Society (TLS) and  Taiwan Institute of International Law (TIIL), many 
scholars made suggestions on resorting to the International Court of Justice avoiding China 
Mainland. Yu Shyi-kun, the then Yilan Magistrate, advocated to “preserve sovereignty 
of Taiwan” and “improve international status of Taiwan in the future” by solving the 
Diaoyu Islands disputes. For details see Taiwan Law Society (TLS) and Taiwan Institute 
of International Law (TIIL) eds., The Seminar on International Law of the Diaoyu Islands: 
Records of Discussion and Essays, 1997. (in Chinese)
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and China Taiwan. It will also increase Taiwanese citizens’ resentment and will 
provide excuses for China Taiwan’s “pro-independence” tendencies, although it is 
an entitlement for China Mainland, as the legitimate national government, to adopt 
such methods.
On the other hand, an important aspect of China Mainland’s consistent claim 
of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is that they constitute an indispensable part 
of China Taiwan. If China wins in the adjudication or judgment, from a theoretical 
law perspective, although a central government has the authority to determine 
administrative divisions, it is more reasonable to incorporate the Diaoyu Islands 
to China Taiwan’s local governments’ jurisdiction, which is also more acceptable 
for Taiwanese. If the current situation persists, in which China Mainland and 
China Taiwan are not unified and the trend of Taiwan’s “independence” continues 
to develop, such a method will not be acceptable by the government of China 
Mainland.
In conclusion, in a situation of “international anarchy”, since compulsory 
jurisdiction in domestic law does not exist in the international society, submitting 
to arbitration or judicature is based on the mutual trust between disputing parties 
and the trust of international courts and international law as applicable rules in the 
judgment. China and Japan have both accumulated rancor and strong defensive 
feelings against each other and China has always been skeptical about international 
arbitration, judicature and international law. There is no practice or precedent that 
China has ever submitted a dispute to international arbitration or judicature. In 
addition, the Diaoyu Islands dispute significantly influences State territory and 
political and economic interests. The traditional Chinese order, logic of language 
and thinking mode are far from modern international law. The legal method does 
not favor China, neither. Moreover, on the Chinese side, the situation of separate 
governance of China Mainland and China Taiwan causes internal friction in 
efforts aimed at solving the Diaoyu Islands dispute. Solving the dispute at a time 
when China Mainland and China Taiwan are not unified will inevitably affect the 
political status across the strait. In consequence, the possibility that China submits 
to international arbitration or judicature is reduced. Adopting legal methods is 
relatively desirable, but not feasible for China.
C. Possible Outcomes of Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands Dispute
With respect to solving the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands dispute, several 
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results may occur due to  a combination of relevant evidence and different methods 
of settlement.
Firstly, “all or nothing”, i.e. the Diaoyu Islands will be obtained by either 
China or Japan as a whole.
This is a result of settling by legal means, arbitration or judicature, since 
evidences of China and Japan all support a result of “all or nothing”. As stated 
above, if Chinese evidence is valid and admitted by the court or arbitral tribunal, 
the Diaoyu Islands will obviously be regarded as “terra nullius” before 14 January 
1895 and they will be obtained by China as a whole; on the contrary, if Chinese 
evidence is declared ineffective by the court or arbitral tribunal and Japanese 
evidence is valid, Japan would have already preoccupied the Diaoyu Islands before 
that crucial date and the Islands will not be “terra nullius”. Japan will obtain the 
Islands as a whole.
Diplomatic means will obviously not lead to a similar result. Since settling the 
dispute by diplomatic means, “nothing” will not be accepted by the two involving 
parties. Negotiation would have broken down before reaching such a result.
Secondly, “partly got and partly lost”, i.e. the Diaoyu Islands will be 
segmented between China and Japan.
This is usually a result of a diplomatic settlement. A diplomatic solution is 
always a compromise of interests of the parties involved. If the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute is solved by diplomatic means, taking into account the characteristics of 
negotiation and both parties’ power, it is highly likely that the Diaoyu Islands will 
be segmented between China and Japan. Based on the geographic distribution and 
size of the Islands, China will probably acquire the Diaoyu Island while Huangwei 
Yu, other small surrounding islands and Chiwei Yu will probably go to Japan. 
Even if the Islands are obtained by one party as a whole, it has to make interest 
compensation in other fields.
Thirdly, China and Japan “shelve differences and seek joint development” of 
the Diaoyu Islands and the surrounding sea area.
This is China’s consistent policy in recent years in dealing with maritime 
delimitation and offshore islands issues. For instance, in the issue regarding the 
islands in the South China Sea, China has always maintained this position, which 
helps reduce international resistance to Chinese national macroscopic strategy. 
However, the proposal of “shelving differences and seeking joint development” has 
not been recognized and implemented by other relevant States, and it seems to be 
China’s own wishful thinking. In its implementation, the proposal is always only 
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claimed by China and only China has unilaterally put aside disputes, which in the 
end encourages other States to further nibble away at China’s interests.
Fourthly, China and Japan waive sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands 
permanently, but not vis-à-vis a third State, and jointly exclude possession from a 
third party.
This result has three characteristics. First, waiver is mutual; second, waiver is 
permanent; third, waiver is not vis-à-vis a third party. This means that for a third 
party, the Islands are not abandoned and thus cannot be obtained by occupation.
This result is relatively more acceptable for both China and Japan, which also 
helps reduce resistance of delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China 
Sea and promotes resource exploitation. However, there has been no similar State 
practice so far. Although this method avoids determining sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu Islands, use of the Islands will still be controversial. The possibility of this 
result is rather reduced.
Fifthly, eliminate the disputed object, namely, destroy the Diaoyu Islands with 
nuclear weapons.
This method and result is only an extreme position held by non-governmental 
figures.33 Since the disputed object is eliminated, China, Japan and their nationals 
will not be able to take advantage of it. This is a malicious damage to the property 
of human beings given by nature and is immoral. Hence, this result is also solely 
a theoretical assumption, which will only come true under the most extreme 
circumstances.
III. The Relationship between the Diaoyu Islands Dispute
       and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
       in the East China Sea
A. Settling in One Bundle
In the East China Sea, two serious disputes exist between China and Japan, 
namely the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the delimitation of the continental shelf and 
33    China Should Flatly Respond to Military Provocation of Japan, at http://www.ren-jian.com/
index.asp?act=ViewEachArticle&ArticlelD= 69, 22 April 2006. (in Chinese)
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the exclusive economic zone.34 The former relates to islands sovereignty; the latter 
relates to ownership of seabed, water and resources. The two issues are closely 
related in international law.
With regard to the relationship between the two disputes, there are two 
methods, either settling in one bundle or settling each matter independently. Which 
method should be adopted by China in solving the two issues? The present author 
argues that settling both issues as one package is of significant disadvantage to 
China. Settling them separately may lead to a result that favors China more.
Land territory is the fundamental basis of claiming continental shelf.35 If 
solving the two issues together, sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands has to be the 
precondition for delimitation of continental shelf in the East China Sea. Since Japan 
is currently at the dominant position in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, if the Diaoyu 
Islands belong to Japan, Japan would probably further claim the continental shelf in 
the East China Sea by using the Diaoyu Islands as a springboard.
Although the 1982 United National Convention on the Law of the Sea provides 
that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”,36 the Convention does 
not explicitly define terms of “human habitation”, “economic life of their own” 
and “rocks”. This will easily cause ambiguity: (1) Does “human habitation” refer 
to temporary habitation or permanent habitation? Can exploiting natural resources 
of their own or surrounding resources in exchange of what is needed for human 
habitation be understood as sufficient to “sustain human habitation”? If so, any 
island with certain area can be inhabited by human beings after exploitation. (2) 
How to understand “economic life of their own”? Should it be understood as “human 
life”? The Diaoyu Islands have vegetation, birds of a large amount and fresh water. 
Is the existence of these organisms sufficient to sustain “economic life of their 
own”? (3) Can the Diaoyu Islands be classified as “rocks”? The Diaoyu Islands are 
full of vegetation, which means the existence of thick soil. Can it still be classified 
34   Considering delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea is even more 
complicated and more representative, the present article only deals with the relationship 
between the dispute of the Diaoyu Islands and the dispute of delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the East China Sea. 
35     Article 76(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea provides: “The conti-
nental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that 
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to 
the outer edge of the continental margin”.
36     Article 121(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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as rocks? Apparently, from a perspective of common meaning, defining the Diaoyu 
Islands, especially the Diaoyu Island itself as “rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own” is not satisfactory. 
Although some scholars from China Taiwan propose that “as far as 
international law (mainly the new law of the sea), in delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the East China Sea, the Diaoyu Islands, which are of small area, no human 
habitation, long distance from land and disputed sovereignty, shall have no effect 
on any delimitation”.37 However, whether this conclusion will be admitted by 
the arbitral tribunal or international court is uncertain. It is only an analysis in 
theory. In international arbitration and judicial practice, “islands far from land and 
close to the assumed middle line of the delimitating States, (in delimitation) are 
often granted partial effect”.38 In negotiating delimitation of the continental shelf 
between China and Japan in the East China Sea, Japan apparently based its claim 
of continental shelf on the Diaoyu Islands.39 If the Diaoyu Islands are declared to 
be under Japanese sovereignty, it is most likely that this claim will be taken into 
account by international arbitral tribunals or courts. 
In conclusion, settling the disputes as one is not advisable for China.
B. Settling Separately 
Settling separately means that the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands dispute 
and delimitation of continental shelf in the East China Sea dispute are settled 
independently. The present author argues this method is more advisable for China. 
The reasons are as followed:
Firstly, the Diaoyu Islands dispute only involves two parties, China and Japan 
while the dispute of continental shelf in the East China Sea concerns third parties, 
for instance, South Korea. Due to the existence of new parties, settling the disputes 
in one bundle would increase the complexity of the disputes, which is also rather 
inconvenient for South Korea.
37   Ma Ying Jeou, Analyzing the Diaoyu Islands and Delimitation of East China Sea from 
the Perspective of the New Law of the Sea, Taipei: Cheng Chung Book, 1986, p. 156. (in 
Chinese)
38    Kuen-chen FU, Equitable Ocean Boundary Delimitation, Taipei: 123 Information Co.,
1989, p. 252. 
39    Oil and Gas Resources Battle Exposing Its Territorial Ambition, Japan Demands 
an Outrageous Price in East Sea Negotiation, at http://military.china.com/zh_cn/
head/83/20051008/12718181.html, 24 April 2006. (in Chinese)
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Secondly, the main basis for China’s claim over the continental shelf in the 
East China Sea is the principle of natural prolongation and the principle of equity. 
Even not considering the effect of Chinese territory – the Diaoyu Islands in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, China could still argue that the continental 
shelf is the natural prolongation of its land which ends at Okinawa Trough. At the 
same time, since the Diaoyu Islands dispute is not settled and sovereignty over the 
Islands is still in controversy, the Islands cannot be the basis of Japan’s claim to 
the continental shelf in international arbitration or judicial practice and will hardly 
be taken into account by the arbitral tribunal or court – since the sovereignty of 
territory itself is disputed, it is certain that any right derived from the territory is 
disputed as well. Without the authority to determine sovereignty of the islands, the 
arbitral tribunal or court will hardly determine those derivative rights.
In addition, settling the disputes independently also concerns the order of 
solving the disputes, namely whether to solve the Diaoyu Islands dispute first 
or solve the dispute of delimitating the continental shelf in the East China Sea 
first. For China, it seems more desirable to solve the dispute of delimitating the 
continental shelf in the East China Sea before the Diaoyu Islands dispute. The 
reasons have been discussed above, i.e. the main basis of China’s claim over the 
continental shelf in the East China Sea is “the principle of natural prolongation”, 
which does not need to consider the Diaoyu Islands. However, if the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute is solved first and Japan obtains the Islands, the Islands will probably be a 
basis for Japan’s claim over the continental shelf in the East China Sea, which will 
do harm to China’s dominant position in the dispute of the continental shelf.
IV. Conclusion
With respect to the procedure or method of settling the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute, for China, based on its cultural tradition, experiences in modern history, 
current political situation and reality of its national power, diplomatic settlement is 
“relatively feasible but not desirable” while legal settlement is “relatively desirable 
but not feasible”. If the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands has to be settled under 
the current situation, the result would probably be that China and Japan divide 
the Diaoyu Islands through diplomatic means. As for whether China will decide 
to solve the dispute and which method will be chosen, it depends on the Chinese 
government’s willingness to accept certain results, i.e. can the Chinese government 
only accept a complete win, or a segmentation of the Diaoyu Islands, or even a 
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complete loss?
It is notable that despite the Diaoyu Islands dispute is a severe territorial 
dispute between China and Japan, it does not represent all of the relations between 
the two countries, and it is not even their most significant aspect. Considering other 
circumstances, it is predictable that in the near future, this dispute will probably not 
influence the overall political and economic relations between China and Japan. 
Once the dispute influences the overall relations between the two States, the dispute 
may be put aside – as a matter of fact, “shelving differences and seeking joint 
development” is an important Chinese policy for dealing with territorial and sea 
area delimitation issues, even though this policy is not very favorable for China and 
the Diaoyu Islands dispute cannot be protracted.
In the Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Chinese side faces great internal friction due 
to separate governance of China Mainland and China Taiwan, of which Japan takes 
advantage. Both sides should be concerned more about the overall national interest 
and not focus on its own rights. This will lead to a result favoring China and is also 
necessary for the national rejuvenation.
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